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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS





                             Petitioner,
   v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                                Respondent
____________
On Petition for Review from an
Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(Board No. A96-203-458)
Immigration Judge:  Rosalind Malloy
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 6, 2008
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, BARRY and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: May 12, 2008)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
2HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Fa Lie petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
finding him ineligible for withholding of removal.  We will deny the petition.
I.
Because we write for the parties, we recount only facts essential to our decision.
Petitioner Lie is a native and citizen of Indonesia and an ethnic Chinese Catholic. 
He arrived in the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor on June 9, 2001 and overstayed
his visa.  Lie conceded removability, but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).  Following a September 12,
2005 hearing on the merits, Immigration Judge (IJ) Rosalind K. Malloy denied Lie’s
requests for relief.
On appeal, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision in all respects.  Lie filed a timely
petition for review that challenged the BIA’s decision only with respect to his claim for
withholding of removal.
II.
Lie claims that he suffered past persecution in Indonesia because of his Chinese
ethnicity and Catholic faith and that he faces a clear probability of future persecution if he
is forced to return.  At an evidentiary hearing before the IJ, Lie testified as to a 1989
incident in which he was insulted while interacting with a street vendor; after Lie asked
the vendor for more water and cautioned the vendor not to accidentally switch his glass, a
3pedestrian called him a “Chinese leper” and said “hey, you Chinese, who do you think
you are that we want to exchange our glasses with you.”
Lie also described two robberies that he claims were motivated by his Chinese
ethnicity.  First, Lie testified that he was taking a public bus home from work in 1990
when a native Indonesian pulled out a knife and yelled “[a]ll Chinas, give me your
wallet.”  Lie also testified that a few months later, he was again riding the bus when a
native Indonesian held a knife to his neck and said “[h]ey China, give me your wallet or
this knife would go deeper.”  Lie claims that although a policeman was five feet away
from the bus and witnessed the incident, he “pretended not to seeing [sic] anything and
turned his back on the crime.”
Furthermore, Lie testified that in May 1998, he encountered native Indonesians
rioting in the street while he was heading home from work; fearing for his safety, he went
to his cousin’s house and hid there for four days.  Lie also described an incident in which
several Islamic scholars were killed while conducting a seminar near his house; soon after
the incident, Lie overheard several Muslims threatening to kill Chinese in retaliation.
Finally, Lie claims that thirty-five Christian churches and two Christian schools
were destroyed in 1996 during riots and that a pastor and his family were burned to death. 
Lie’s affidavit also describes the riots of May 1998, in which Chinese homes and stores
were burned and Chinese women were raped and killed.
4III.
Where, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ’s findings and also discusses specific parts
of the IJ’s decision, we review both decisions.  Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir.
2004).  We review the IJ’s factual determinations under the substantial evidence standard,
which requires us to uphold them unless the record evidence would compel a reasonable
factfinder to conclude to the contrary.  Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 597 (3d
Cir. 2003).
IV.
To qualify for withholding of removal, an alien must show a clear probability that
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of one of the statutorily-protected
grounds.  8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b).  If the alien demonstrates past
persecution on account of one of the protected grounds, he is entitled to a presumption
that his life or freedom would be threatened upon his return.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i). 
Alternatively, if the alien cannot establish past persecution, he may qualify for relief by
showing that it is more likely than not that he would be persecuted if returned.  8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(b)(1)(iii).
With regard to Lie’s claims of past persecution, the IJ noted that none of the
incidents that Lie had described were on account of his Catholic faith.  In addition, the IJ
questioned whether the robberies that Lie described were on account of his Chinese
5ethnicity.  Alternatively, the IJ found that none of the events that Lie had described rose
to the level of persecution.
Though the INA does not define persecution, courts have recognized it as an
“extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as
offensive.”  Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993).   In Fatin, we described
persecution as “threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe
that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.”  Id. at 1240.  Though the harassment and
isolated criminal acts that Lie experienced are undoubtedly troubling, they nevertheless
fail to meet the stringent standard articulated in Fatin.  Furthermore, though Lie describes
various incidents of rioting that occurred while he was in Indonesia, we note that he was
not present at any of them.  Accordingly, we hold that substantial evidence supports the
IJ’s factual determination that Lie did not suffer past persecution in Indonesia.
Lie has also failed to establish that he faces a clear probability of persecution if
returned to Indonesia.  To meet the less stringent “well-founded fear” standard applicable
to asylum claims, Lie must show either that he faces an individualized risk of persecution
if returned or that there is a “pattern or practice” of persecution of ethnic Chinese
Christians in Indonesia.  Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 2005).  Lie has
presented no evidence to show that he would be singled out for persecution upon his
return.  Furthermore, though the country condition reports that Lie has submitted indicate
6that some anti-Chinese Christian violence persists in Indonesia, this nevertheless does not
rise to the level of a “pattern or practice” of persecution.  See Lie, 396 F.3d at 537.
Therefore, because Lie has "fail[ed] to establish the well-founded fear of
persecution required for a grant of asylum, [he] will, by definition, have failed to establish
the clear probability of persecution required for withholding of deportation."  Zubeda v.
Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 469-70 (3d Cir. 2003).
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
